Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror

In Chapter 2, Mamdani traces the evolution of American foreign policy during the Cold War, focusing on how the US embraced proxy warfare and increasingly blurred the line between legitimate military action and political terror. Mamdani begins by recounting his experience as a lecturer in Tanzania in 1975, a pivotal year marked by the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa. These events shifted the Cold War’s epicenter from Southeast Asia to Africa, prompting a transformation in US strategic thinking. The Nixon Doctrine emerged from America’s Vietnam failure, encapsulating the idea that “Asian boys must fight Asian wars” (64). This doctrine represented a shift toward indirect warfare: using local proxies rather than American troops. Laos provided the ideal model of a covert war run by the CIA using Hmong mercenaries and a devastating air campaign, all hidden from public view. In contrast, Vietnam represented the dangers of direct intervention, which led to mounting domestic opposition and failure.

However, financing proxy wars covertly through public funds proved difficult. This obstacle led the US, especially the CIA, to rely on illicit funding mechanisms, often involving the global “drug trade” (66). Alfred McCoy’s work shows how CIA operations helped expand opium production in Burma, Laos, and Afghanistan.